As an effective resource allocation approach, double auctions (DAs) have been extensively studied in electronic commerce. Most previous studies have focused on how to design strategy-proof DA mechanisms, while not much research effort has been done concerning privacy and security issues. However, security, especially privacy issues have become such a public concern that the European governments lay down the law to enforce the privacy guarantees recently. In this paper, to address the privacy issue in electronic auctions, we concentrate on how to design a privacy-preserving mechanism for double auctions by employing Goldwasser-Micali homomorphic encryption and sorting networks. We achieve provable privacy such that the auctions do not reveal any bid information except the auction results, resulting in a strict privacy guarantee. Moreover, to achieve practical system performance, we compare different sorting algorithms, and suggest using the faster ones. Experimental results show that different sorting algorithms may have great effect on the performance of our mechanism, and demonstrate the practicality of our protocol for real-world applications in electronic commerce.
Introduction
With the rapid development of electronic commerce over the Internet, a large number of auction services exist on the Internet during the past a few years. Double auctions are adopted by many of current electronic exchanges for matching buyers and sellers (Shi et al., 2016) . Other auctions are also widely employed as efficient mechanisms to allocate goods, resource, etc., to promote the ideality of competitive pricing and to maximize the commodity value. The rapidity and convenience of the Internet has accelerated online auctions to individuals, businesses and governments around the world, admittedly, and the range of items sold by auctions also has been greatly extended by e-commerce, where millions of transactions can be accomplished in the blink of an eye. For example, eBay-the most popular and well-known auction site on the Internet announced that its total commodity trading in 2017 was US$88.4 billion, with net revenues of US$9.567 billion, an increase of 7% over the 2016 (http://www.ebay.com).
At present, there are four basic types of auctions: the English (also called the oral, open, or ascending-bid) auction, the Dutch (or descending-bid) auction, the sealed-bid auction, and the double auction (DA) (McAfee, 1992) . In different application scenarios, each type of auction has its advantages and disadvantages. Numerous auction mechanisms have been proposed in order to satisfy various economic properties such as truthfulness, profit maximization, and social efficiency (cf. Iosifidis et al., 2015; Li et al., 2016; Cai et al., 2014 and references therein) . Unfortunately, living in the era of information, it is extremely difficult to guarantee complete security and privacy. According to
• In 2017, Bithumb, South Korea's first virtual currency trading platform, was hacked and about 30,000 personal user data were stolen. After the information was leaked, the hacker used personal user data to steal the money in the account and telephoned the exchange staff to make phone fraud.
When bid is the only factor in determining the winner of an auction, then an increasing number of participants tend to adopt a privacy-preserving, sealed-bid auction to prevent bid privacy disclosure.
McAfee's double auction is most widely used because of its economic robustness such as truthfulness, individual rationality and ex-post budget balance (Chen et al., 2014) . However, most studies on it have focused on how to design strategy-proof DA mechanisms (Colini-Baldeschi et al., 2016; Nassiri-Mofakham et al., 2015; Samimi et al., 2016; Shi et al., 2016; Ma and Leung, 2007) , while little research effort has been done concerning privacy and security issues in the auctions, leading to bid privacy disclosure largely. This would in turn lead to a series of severe consequences.
• For the sellers, it can easily adjust its bid according to the buyers' and other sellers' bids to obtain extra profit.
• For the buyers, similarly, it can easily adjust its bid according to the sellers' and other buyers' bids to lower its cost.
• For the auctioneer, since it can obtain bid information directly from both sellers and buyers, it may tamper with the auction result, and hence destroy the truthfulness of the whole auction.
Our solution
Recently, some mechanisms for privacy-preserving auctions have been proposed (Huang et al., 2013; Nojoumian and Stinson, 2014) . These works dealt with only single-sided auctions. For double auctions, there are multiple potential buyers and potential sellers simultaneously permitted to bid to exchange designated goods, and a more complex logic is needed to match between buying and selling requirements. Indeed, there have also been some double auction mechanisms with privacy protection, such as Li et al. (2015) and Chen et al. (2015) . However, they are mainly focused on the application setting of double spectrum auctions, and use quite different security techniques 2 such as garbled circuits and secret sharing. In contrast, this paper will employ Goldwasser-Micali homomorphic encryption to provide an alternative privacy-preserving mechanism based on McAfee's double auction mechanism, and experimentally validate that different sorting algorithms may have great influence on the performance of the proposed mechanism. Architecturally, our auction framework is depicted in Fig. 1 : each buyer (or seller) submits his bid to the auctioneer. But both buyers and sellers do not reveal their respective bid information during the auction. Instead, they submit encrypted bids to the auctioneer who determines the winners and assignments in company with the agent, which plays a role in administering the private key for the privacy-preserving auction. As long as the auctioneer and the agent do not collude to manipulate the auction, our mechanism can achieve provable privacy. Our contributions can be summarized as follows.
(1) As far as we know, we are the first to design a privacy-preserving double auction with Goldwasser-Micali homomorphic encryption, and implement the mechanism with different sorting algorithms. (2) We theoretically prove the privacy of our double auction mechanism, with the privacy formulation from secure two party computations. (3) We experimentally evaluate and compare the performance of our mechanism using different sorting algorithms. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces some technical preliminaries. We present our mechanism in detail, and theoretically prove its privacy in Section 3. In section 4, we implement our mechanism and evaluate its running performance with different sorting algorithms. Section 5 reviews related work and discusses the difference about those studies briefly. Finally, we make a conclusion in Section 6.
Sellers

TECHNICAL PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we introduce some technical preliminaries for understanding our mechanism subsequently.
McAfee's Double Auction
We assume that there are M sellers and N buyers in the auction, and all auction goods are homogeneous which means that each individual good is identical and that all goods have little or no differentiation in terms of features, benefits, or quality. Each seller s i bids V s i to sell a good, and each buyer b i bids V b i to buy a good. The auction proceeds as follows:
(1) Bid sorting: Sort buyers' bids in non-increasing order and sellers' bids in non-descending order: 
Homomorphic Encryption
In our design of a privacy-preserving auction mechanism, a semantically secure cryptosystem is needed. Homomorphic encryption is a special type of encryption technique that allows computations to be done on encrypted data. In our paper, we choose the Goldwasser-Micali cryptosystem (K, E, D) (Blum and Goldwasser, 1985) , where K, E and D denote the key generation algorithm, encryption algorithm, and decryption algorithm, respectively. These algorithms of Goldwasser-Micali scheme definition can be described as follows.
• Key generation: the algorithm takes a security parameter as input and then generates two distinct large prime numbers p and q, computes n = pq and finds a non-residue x. The public key k p is (x, n), and the private key k s is (p, q).
• Encryption algorithm: a message m ∈ {0, 1} l is encrypted as the ciphertext c which makes use of the public key:
Where y is randomly chosen from Z * n .
• Decryption algorithm: a ciphertext c is decrypted as the message m using the prime factorization (p, q), where m = 0 if c is a quadratic residue, m = 1 otherwise.
This cryptosystem possesses the XOR homomorphism, that is, for any m, m ∈ {0, 1} the following equation holds.
In particular, a ciphertext c = E(m, k p ) can be randomized into other forms without changing its corresponding plaintext, as follows.
Cryptographical Privacy
In our auction context, the standard definition of cryptographical privacy against semi-honest adversaries in twoparty computations can be described as follows (Chen et al., 2016) .
Definition 1 (Privacy against semi-honest attackers). Let f (x, y) be a functionality with two inputs x and y, and two outputs f A (x, y) and f B (x, y). Suppose that protocol II computes functionality f (x, y) between two parties Alice and Bob. Let V ) ). Then we say that protocol II preserves privacy (or is secure) against semi-honest adversaries if there exist probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) simulators S 1 and S 2 such that
Where ≡ denotes computational indistinguishability.
In the sense of cryptography, to protect both sellers' and buyers' bids (privacy), the secure protocol should reveal nothing about these bids except what is revealed from the auction outcome.
OUR MECHANISM
In this section, we propose a privacy-preserving auction mechanism, whose auction framework is illustrated in Fig. 1 . As shown in the figure, the auctioneer receives the (encrypted) bids from all buyers and sellers and then performs the privacy-preserving auction, while the agent is in charge of assisting the auctioneer in the process of auction. Adopting the above framework, we design a privacy-preserving auction mechanism. Note that in the paper, we assume that the auctioneer and the agent do not collude with each other. This assumption is essentially necessary to achieve cryptographical privacy, since if the auctioneer and the agent collude with each other, namely, both computation parties are corrupted, then all bid information will be certainly leaked to the adversary.
denotes the binary representation of V, with α L the most significant bit, and α 1 the least significant bit.
Privacy-preserving Auction Framework
In order to guarantee that neither the auctioneer nor the agent can obtain anything about bid information except the final auction outcome during the auction, we design our privacy-preserving double auction mechanism using homomorphic encryption and sorting networks in Protocol 1. In our paper, we assume that there is an authenticated and secure communication channel between buyers (or sellers) and the auctioneer, and between the auctioneer and the agent. The design rationale can be described as follows.
(1) Setup The agent generates its secret-public key pair of Goldwasser-Micali homomorphic encryption, and then publishes its public key to all the participants of the auction, including the auctioneer, the sellers and the buyers.
(2) Bidding Each buyer or seller encrypts its bid-ID pair in the form of EBV using the public key of the agent, and submits its EBV pair to the auctioneer. Note that, in order to determine privately who the winners are, we need to encrypt the buyers' or sellers' IDs in the EBV form together with their bids. Otherwise, the bid ranking information of both sellers and buyers would simply leak in the next step.
(3) Private sorting The auctioneer and the agent cooperate to privately sort the buyers' EBV bid-ID pairs in non-ascending order of bids, and the sellers' EBV bid-ID pairs in non-descending order of bids, making use of the XOR homomorphism of the Goldwasser-Micali cryptosystem. How to privately perform the sorting procedure is detailed in Section 3.4. In this process, the auctioneer knows nothing about the buyers' or sellers' bids; similarly, the agent only plays a role in providing some necessary calculation results to the auctioneer and also knows nothing about the bids. In the end, the auctioneer holds the private sorting for both the sellers' and the buyers' bid-ID pairs.
(4) Private winner determination The main goal of this step is to obtain the encrypted auction outcome under the collaborative work of the auctioneer and the agent. A natural procedure for winner determination proceeds as follows. In order to determine the index of the last profitable transaction, the auctioneer compares the sorted seller's EBV bids and buyer's EBV bids one by one, which should start from the minimum EBV bid in the seller set and the maximum EBV bid in the buyer set. And then the encrypted comparison results are sent to the agent, who decrypts these encrypted data using the private key, and sends the index of the last profitable transaction k back to the auctioneer. Getting k, the auctioneer can easily obtain the EBV auction outcome.
(5) Outcome release A naive idea to release the auction outcome is as follows. The auctioneer sends the EBV IDs of the winners, namely the first (k − 1) sellers and the first (k − 1) buyers, and the EBV clearing prices E L (V s k ) and E L (V b k ) to the agent. The agent decrypts all these received EBV data, and sends back the plain final auction outcome including the IDs of winners and the clearing prices to the auctioneer.
The idea above seems to work well: the auctioneer and the agent cooperate to determine the winners and no exact bids are leaked to them. However, there is indeed some information about the bids leaking. It is noteworthy that each 5 buyer's or seller's ID and bid are combined together as a whole, to put it another way, each ID is uniquely mapped to a bid. So, if the encrypted IDs of winners are decrypted just in the current orders of sellers and buyers, which are sorted in term of bids, the bid ranking information of both seller and buyer winners would be certainly leaked. The leaked information is obviously more than what we can infer from the auction outcome. Thus, in the sense of cryptography, the above procedure is not really secure.
Protocol 1 Privacy-preserving Double Auction Output: Double Auction results in the clear Step1: Setup The agent generates its secret-public key pair (sk, pk) of homomorphic encryption, and then publishes its public key pk to the auctioneer, the buyers and the sellers.
Step3: Private sorting
The auctioneer and the agent cooperate to privately sort sellers' encrypted bid-ID pairs in non-descending order, and buyers' encrypted bid-ID pairs in non-ascending order, both in term of bids:
Note that, for convenience, here we abuse the same indexes after sorting.
Step4: Private winner determination
The auctioneer and the agent cooperate to privately compare
The auctioneer gets the encrypted auction outcome including the encrypted IDs of the seller and buyer winners, and the encrypted clearing prices, as follows.
Encrypted winner IDs:
Encrypted clearing prices:
The auctioneer randomly permutes the two arrays (6) and (7), respectively, and then sends the resulted arrays to the agent.
The agent decrypts the encrypted auction outcome:
The agent then sorts the two arrays of s i 's and b i 's in ascending order, and returns all decrypted auction outcome to the auctioneer.
Finally, the auctioneer charges the expenses from each winning buyer and pays the earnings to each winning seller.
In order to make this natural procedure of winner determination secure, something has to be done before the decryption of the auction outcome, so that neither the auctioneer nor the agent can match the ID of any winner to its bid ranking position. Specifically, we let the auctioneer randomly permute the encrypted IDs of both seller and buyer winners before sending to the agent for decryption, and let the agent also randomly permute the decrypted IDs of both seller and buyer winners before returning back to the auctioneer (In protocol 1, instead of applying a random 6 permutation, we sort IDs in ascending order, assuming that the bids are independent on IDs.). Finally, when the auction is over, the auctioneer announces final winner list and charges the expenses from each winning buyer, and pays the earnings to each winning seller. The global algorithm is illustrated in Protocol 1.
Private Gate Computation
In term of computation theory, any computable function can be represented by a Boolean circuit with only XOR and AND gates. Thus, to compute an auction privately, we need to compute both XOR and AND gates privately. With the XOR homomorphism of the Goldwasser-Micali cryptosystem, we can let the auctioneer directly compute the XOR gate over the ciphertexts without knowing the private key and the input bits. Then the question is if we can also compute the AND gate privately with the Goldwasser-Micali cryptosystem. The answer is yes. Our main idea is to introduce some appropriate interactions between the auctioneer and the agent, in addition to the application of the XOR homomorphism. We now describe how to compute an AND gate privately.
Let a, b ∈ {0, 1} denote the two input bits to the AND gate, respectively. Suppose that the auctioneer holds the encrypted bits E(a) and E(b), and wants to compute E(a ∧ b) (∧ represents AND gate) without knowing anything about the secret key and the input bits a and b with some interactions with the agent. The computation proceeds as follows.
Firstly, the auctioneer selects two random bits r 1 , r 2 ∈ {0, 1} and then calculates E(r 1 ) and E(r 2 ) using the public key.
Then, the auctioneer can obtain the following equations according to Goldwasser-Micali homomorphic property:
Since a = r 1 ⊕ r 1 ⊕ a and b = r 2 ⊕ r 2 ⊕ b, we can decompose the bit a into the XOR of two bits a 1 = r 1 and a 2 = r 1 ⊕ a. Similarly, the bit b can be computed by
Distinctly, due to the auctioneer knows the value of a 1 , b 1 , E(a) and E(b), so it can compute E(a 2 ), E(b 2 ), E(a 1 ∧b 1 ) and E(a 1 ∧ b 2 ):
Similarly, the value of E(a 2 ∧ b 1 ) can easily get. Nevertheless, the auctioneer cannot calculate by itself the value of E(a 2 ∧ b 2 ).
Next, the auctioneer should send the value of E(a 2 ) and E(b 2 ) to the agent who manages the private key. After that the agent decrypts them to obtain the value of a 2 and b 2 , and then passes the calculation result of E(a 2 ∧ b 2 ) back to the auctioneer.
Finally, the auctioneer can compute the value of E(a ∧ b) absolutely according to the Equation (8).
Using the above analysis and prove, it can draw a conclusion that information leakage will be avoided as long as the auctioneer and the agent cannot collude to seek personal interests. The private AND computation is depicted in Protocol 2, where AR and AT are the abbreviation of the auctioneer and the agent respectively.
Protocol 2 Product of Two Bits
Input: AR holds E(a) and E(b) Output: AR obtain E(a ∧ b) 1:
Step AR 2: a 1 , b 1 ∈ {0, 1}; //Select randomly 3: E(a 2 ) ← E(a 1 ) × E(a);
E(a 2 ∧ b 1 ) ← E(a 2 ) 14: end if 15: Sends E(a 2 ) and E(b 2 ) to AT; 16: Step AT 17:
Private Integer Comparison
As we can see clearly from Protocol 1, one of the most important steps is private integer comparison. Based on the private gate computation described in Section 3.2, in order to design a private protocol for integer comparison, we need only to design a Boolean circuit comprised of only XOR and AND gates, then for each gate apply either XOR or AND private gate computation step, and finally all these steps are composed as a whole protocol. Specifically, we could take cognizance of the difference between the XOR and AND private gate computations. The former only requires computation using Equation (2) without any communication, which needs a small price; however, the cost of the latter is high by using Protocol 2 in comparison with the former due to both computation and communication overheads. Just for this reason, we demand to minimize the number of AND gates as possible as we can.
Concretely, the procedures to design a comparison circuit and the pseudo-codes are explained as follows. We denote two L-bits integers by x = (x L , x L−1 , · · · , x 1 ) and y = (y L , y L−1 , · · · , y 1 ). One 2-input AND gate and three XOR gates can achieve a 1-bit comparator shown in Fig. 2 , and then L sequential 1-bit comparator can compose comparison circuit (CMP as illustrated in Fig. 3) . Specifically,
Through comparing x i with y i from the low to the high, and then passing the result as an input to the next comparator, we achieve a private comparison of two L-bits positive integers x, y and obtain the result z.
After detailed investigation and research, our design determines to apply the circuit proposed in Kolesnikov et al. (2009) for integer comparison, which is optimized by "free-XOR" gates and exactly matches our design goals. 
end for
return z = c L+1 7: end function
Private Sorting
As stated previously, in our main protocol we need to sort the encrypted buyers' and sellers' bid values in a certain way. Similarly to the design of private integer comparison, we can just design a sorting Boolean circuit composed of only XOR and AND gates. Based on the integer comparison circuit presented in Section 3.3, we can more easily describe the sorting circuits used in our work.
Due to our private mechanism design from the circuit level, our main protocol can adopt various sorting circuits. We compare the influence of different sorting circuits on our privacy-preserving auction mechanism. Specifically, we have employed the selection sort (SeSort), the bitonic sorting network (BiSort) and the odd-even merge sorting network (OESort) (?; Wang et al., 2010a; Ye et al., 2010) . The comparison result displays the immense advantage of the odd-even sorting network which is shown in Section 4 in some detail. The sorting algorithms are presented as follows.
• SeSort. The selection sorting algorithm is noted for its simplicity which has O(n 2 ), and it has performance advantages over more complicated algorithms in certain situations, particularly where auxiliary memory is limited.
• Sorting Network. A circuit that sorts an input sequence (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ) into a monotonically increasing sequence (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ). The main component of sorting network is compare-and-swap circuits, a binary operator taking as input a pair (x 1 , x 2 ), and returning the sorted pair (x 1 , x 2 ), with x 1 =min(x 1 , x 2 ) and x 2 =max(x 1 , x 2 ). Fig. 4 gives an illustration of a compare-and-swap circuit and a sorting network for n = 4.
(1) BiSort. Bitonic sort is one of the fastest sorting networks by taking the divide-and-conquer strategy. The key building blocks of a bitonic sorting network are the bitonic merge networks which rearrange bitonic sequences to be ordered. A bitonic sequence is a sequence with x 1 ≤ · · · ≤ x k ≥ · · · ≥ x n for some k(1 ≤ k ≤ n), or a circular shift of such a sequence. (2) OESort. The odd-even merge sorting algorithm is based on a merge algorithm that merges two sorted halves of a sequence to a completely sorted sequence. As desirable properties, the odd-even merge sorting network is data-independent and achieves a computation complexity of O(n log 2 n). In practice, it outperforms most widely used sorting network algorithms (Emmadi et al., 2015) . Algorithm 4 Select Sorting Input: sequence a = {a 0 , · · · , a n−1 } Output: the sorted sequence(non-decreasing) 1: function SeSort(a)
2:
k ← i 4:
if CMP(a j , a k ) then 6:
end if if n > 1 then 3:
apply OESort(n/2) recursively to the two halves a 0 , ..., a n/2−1 and a n/2 , ..., a n−1 of the sequence 4:
end if 6: end function Algorithm 7 Odd-even Merge Input: sequence a = {a 0 , · · · , a n−1 } of length n > 1 whose two halves a 0 , ..., a n/2−1 and a n/2 , ..., a n−1 are sorted (n a power of 2) Output: the sorted sequence 1: function OEMerge(n) 2:
if n > 2 then 3:
apply OEMerge(n/2) recursively to the even subsequence a 0 , a 2 , ..., a n−2 and a 1 , a 3 , ..., a n−1 of the sequence 4:
if CMP(a i , a i+1 ) = true then Step2: Bidding Each buyer or seller encrypts its bid-ID pair in the EBV form using the public key of the agent, and submits
pk (s i )} to the auctioneer. For example, the buyer b 1 submits E pk (200, 1) and the seller s 1 submits E pk (220, 1) to the auctioneer.
Step3: Private sorting The auctioneer inputs the sellers' EBV bid-ID pairs and the buyers' EBV bid-ID pairs into a private sorting protocol, and gains a non-descending order of the former and a non-ascending order of the latter:
The sellers' EBV bid-ID pairs:
The buyers' EBV bid-ID pairs:
E pk (550, 5) ≥ E pk (400, 3) ≥ E pk (300, 4) ≥ E pk (220, 1) ≥ E pk (180, 2)
Step4: Private winner determination The auctioneer with the assistance of the agent compares the above encrypted sellers' bids E L pk (V s i ) with the corresponding encrypted buyers' bids E L pk (V b i ) in proper sequence until the index of the last profitable transaction k is found. In light of Equation (1), we can find k = 3, that is tantamount to mean, the first two sellers and the first two buyers are the winners.
Outcome release Before sending the auction outcome in the EBV form for decryption, the auctioneer needs to randomly permute the EBV IDs whose index is before 3, and then submits the resulted arrays to the agent.
After decryption, the agent is aware of that the group of sellers {s 3 , s 5 } and the group of buyers {b 5 , b 3 } are the winners. And then he needs to sort the two groups in ascending order ({s 3 , s 5 }, {b 3 , b 5 }) and sends all decrypted data back to the auctioneer. Finally, the auctioneer charges the price of 300 from each winning buyer and pays the price of 200 for each winning seller. 12 3.6. Security Analysis Now we prove theoretically that our mechanism (Protocol 1) preserves privacy in the sense of Definition 1. Note that since all sellers and buyers take part in the auction by providing their encrypted bids and IDs, and receiving the plain auction outcome, they do not actually participate in the essential computations. We therefore need to mainly prove that the auction computations between the auctioneer and the agent preserve privacy. To prove this, we take two steps. First, we show that our gate computations (like Protocol 2) are private. Second, we show that Protocol 1 is private based on the privacy of the gate computations. Theorem 1. Given two encrypted bits, we can privately compute the encrypted result of a XOR or AND gate in the presence of semi-honest adversaries.
Proof. First, it is obvious that an XOR gate can be computed privately. Let the auctioneer holds the two encrypted bits, then it can compute the encrypted result by immediately multiplying the two input ciphers. The process is private since neither the auctioneer nor the agent knows anything about the two input bits, and both their views are some ciphertexts generated with a semantically secure cryptosystem or a random key pair, which can be easily simulated.
Next, we show that Protocol 2 computes an AND gate privately. We show that both the auctioneer's and the agent's views can be simulated. In Protocol 2, the view of the auctioneer is
Where the first three ciphers can be simulated with arbitrary three ciphers encrypted with the same public key due to the semantic security of the homomorphic encryption, and the latter two bits are random bits and can be simulated with two random bits drawn from the same distribution.
The view of the agent is {a 2 , b 2 }, which are also two random bits and can be simulated similarly. We now can conclude that Protocol 2 computes an AND gate privately. Therefore, Theorem 1 is proved.
Theorem 2. Protocol 1 is private in the presence of semi-honest adversaries.
Proof. To prove the theorem, we need only to show that we can compute every step privately, and then sequentially compose these steps getting a whole private protocol. Now we show the privacy of each step based on Theorem 1.
Step 1 is naturally private due to the normal cryptosystem's setup.
Step 2 is private due to the semantic security of the used cryptosystem.
Step 3 can be implemented using a sorting circuit comprised of only XOR and AND gates, and the circuit can be privately computed gate by gate. Therefore, based on Theorem 1 and the sequential composition theorem (Hazay and Lindell, 2010) , this step is also private.
Step 4 is private similarly to Step 3. In
Step 5, we carefully design the outcome release, such that only the auction outcome including the IDs of winners and the clearing prices are revealed (Note that we use a random permutation for the auctioneer and the agent, respectively, so that the bid ranking information of winners is leaked to none of them). Therefore, this step is private, too.
With the sequential composition theorem (Hazay and Lindell, 2010) , we can conclude that Protocol 1 is private.
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we implement our proposed mechanism for double auctions using Java in Windows 10 with Intel's Core 4 Duo CPU 2.20 GHz. Furthermore, we analyze the influence of proposed protocol performance using different sorting algorithms such as the selection sort (SeSoet), the bitonic sorting network (BiSort) and the odd-even merge sorting network (OESort). We simulate the auctioneer and the agent with the two processes on a computer.
The experimental setting is as follows: the bit length of homomorphic encryption scheme bitlen (i.e. L in Definition 2) is 8 or 16 bits; the numbers (M, N)(assume M = N) of sellers and buyers are ranging from 8 to 256 which must be a power of 2. All experimental results are averaged on 10 random repetitions. In our evaluation, we concentrate on the performance metric of computation complexity which can be reflected in total CPU time spent by the auctioneer 13 and the agent. Figure 5 shows the curves of running times and message volumes of our proposed protocol as the numbers M(or N) vary from 8 to 256, with bitlen=8 and bitlen=16, respectively. According to the figure, we can make the following observations:
• Curve Trend: For all curves, the computation complexity of our protocol is increasing as the number of sellers or buyers increases. Specially, with the growth of the number M(or N), the running time of the selection sort is rising sharply; by comparison, two other curves are rising slowly.
• Performance Comparison: Given the number of sellers or buyers, the computation complexity of SeSort is much larger than that of OESort and BiSort. Obviously, the difference becomes more significant as the number of M(or N) increases. For example, when the number of sellers or buyers is 256 and bitlen=8, the running time of SeSort is about 132 min and that of OESort is only about 15 min.
• Influence of bitlen: Employing the same sort algorithm, when the bitlen is twice as much, the running time would increase obviously. In particular, as for the selection sort, the running time is also about double times that of the original.
From the analytical and experimental results above, we can see that the efficiency of the odd-even merge sorting network is significantly or slightly better than that of the selection sort or the bitonic sorting, which can achieve a computation complexity of O(n log 2 n) and be feasible for practical applications. Take into account this reason, we are recommending the odd-even merge sorting network in the proposed protocol.
RELATED WORK
In this section, we review existing work on secure and privacy-preserving auctions and mechanism designs and explore the unique features that we have proposed.
Double auctions have been studied extensively in recent years. For instance, Wang et al. proposed TODA (Wang et al., 2010b) , a truthful online double auction for allocation in wireless networks. Samimi et al. proposed CDARA (Samimi et al., 2016) to come to an optimal market-based resource allocation in cloud computing environments. Nassiri-Mofakham et al. presented a new packaging model MACBID (Nassiri-Mofakham et al., 2015) in order to find the combination (and quantities) of the items and the total price which best satisfy the bidder's need. Bing et al. investigated bidding strategies for automated traders that select marketplaces and submit offers across multiple double auction marketplaces (Shi et al., 2016) . However, most of them considered only single-sided auctions, and the existing double auction mechanisms do not provide too much privacy guarantee.
Extensive work has emphasized on privacy-preserving auction designs for conventional auctions, such as Li et al. (2015) , Peng et al. (2002) , Suzuki and Yokoo (2003) , and Yokoo and Suzuki (2004) . However, most of these studies (Peng et al., 2002; Suzuki and Yokoo, 2003; Yokoo and Suzuki, 2004) had the drawback of confidential information disclosure in the sense of cryptography. The research Li et al. (2015) did preserve privacy in the sense of cryptography like our work, but it paid more attention to double spectrum auctions making use of garbled circuits. Although utilizing garbled circuits have some advantages in terms of computation overhead, our main design targets are to achieve an alternative privacy-preserving double auction mechanism based on Goldwasser-Micali homomorphic encryption, and to analyze the influence of the proposed protocol performance with regard to different sorting algorithms. Furthermore, the protocols and algorithms proposed in our paper can also be used to combine with the garbled circuits to obtain a better performance.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have designed an alternative privacy-preserving mechanism for double auctions. As far as we know, the proposed mechanism is the first scheme for privacy-preserving double auctions based on Goldwasser-Micali homomorphic encryption. Moreover, we have theoretically proved that the proposed mechanism preserves privacy in the presence of semi-honest adversaries. Finally, we have investigated three sorting circuits for our mechanism, and experimentally shown that different sorting algorithms may have great influence on the performance of the mechanism. 14 oe We believe that our practical, easily implemented mechanism can be applied to other real-world applications for privacy protection, such as trading markets, electronic transactions and public verification of private data.
